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This article critically examines how banks and microfinance companies morally construed 
and evaluated their lending practices and income in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Banks 
occupy a powerful position in a monetary economy, because they do not merely create 
money ‘out of thin air’, but can charge for it – i.e. interest (Sayer 2015; Hudson 2014; 
Pettifor 2017). In doing so, they obtain unearned income, and extract wealth. The article 
examines how banks and microfinance companies used myths, ideals, discourses, norms and 
emotions to justify and de-politicise their unequal power, unearned income and damaging 
effects. The study draws on the moral economy perspective and the Post-Keynesian theory of 
money to understand financial institutions’ moral justifications and rationalisations of their 
position and power. This article contributes to a wider literature on neoliberalism and 
morality in post-socialist economies. 
 





This article critically examines how financial institutions (such as banks and microfinance 
institutions1) justify their lending practices and income from interest in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The lenders’ construals of norms and obligations are central in shaping and de-
politicising the unequal social relationship between lenders and borrowers. The study draws 
on recent political economy scholarship on money creation to understand how credit, power 
and morality are intertwined (Hudson 2014; Pettifor 2017; Sayer 2015). The article aims to 
contribute to the literature on the moral dimensions of economic practices in developing and 
post-Soviet economies (e.g. Hann 2018; Wiegratz 2016; Rudnyckyj and Osella 2017). 
The article’s entry point is that all economies are ‘moral’ economies (Keat 2000). Economic 
activities are not solely driven by the pursuit of individual self-interest, but are influenced by 
other moral sentiments as well as moral concerns, norms, rules, rights and discourses. Rules 
and norms do not merely regularise and normalise economic relations, they justify and 
rationalise who should do, get or control what (Sayer 2018). Financial relations are 
particularly important in neoliberal economies, because they expand the role of economic 
rent and unearned income beyond the ownership and control of land, property and utilities to 
money (Husdon 2014). 
The moral perspective of bankers and financiers is rarely explored in social science (Ho 
2012; Pelkmans and Umetbaeva 2018). Social scientists have either avoided interrogating the 
issue, or have presumed financial activities to be already predefined immoral or amoral, even 
though social actors articulate moral claims to explain and justify them. Ho (2012) observes 
that social science is missing critical accounts of financiers’ actual discourses of morality, 
and how they morally construe and legitimise their activities. This article contributes to the 
literature on debt and morality by focusing on bankers’ and financiers’ moral justifications, 
norms and beliefs for lending and interest (Graeber 2011; Sayer 2015; Hudson 2018). 
This study uses the concept of ‘moral economy’ to examine how moral sentiments, norms 
and beliefs shape both formal and informal economic practices and institutions, and the way 
these are reinforced, compromised or overridden by economic power and pressures (Sayer 
2007). In addition to being an object of study, the term ‘moral economy’ is a kind of inquiry 
that embraces both analytical and evaluative modes. The moral economy approach ‘analyses 
and assesses the fairness and justifications of actually existing economic relations and 
practices’ (Sayer 2018: 23). As economic relations and institutions affect human flourishing 
and have ethical implications, social scientists cannot avoid making evaluations in terms of 
well-being, justice and fairness. 
This article contributes to the moral economy scholarship in two ways. First, the study 
offers first person evaluations of lending as fair or unfair, good or bad. Going beyond the 
usual focus on financial crisis, irrationality and fraud (Jessop 2015; Appadurai 2012; Whyte 
and Wiegratz 2016), it examines the moral evaluations of taken-for-granted rights and 
practices underpinning debt (Sayer 2015; Hudson 2018; Graeber 2011). It critically discusses 
the moral justifications and rationalisations of the basic features of the lender-borrower 
relationship, in particular property rights of money, and what banks and debtors are allowed 
and required to do. It assesses how financial actors construe the moral influences on their 
practices, and evaluate the implications on society. 
Second, the study shows that power has a lot to do with the origins and maintenance of debt, 
and little to do with rational deliberations over its fairness and legitimacy (Hudson 2014). 
Banks do not merely create credit money ‘out of thin air’, but in charging for it extract rent 
 
1 Microfinance institutions provide basic financial services to low-income clients, who traditionally lack access 
to banking services. They specialise in small loans, and some also offer deposit accounts. Microfinance 
companies refer to for-profit microfinance institutions. 
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(Pettifor 2017). Once interest has become an established practice, its validity is not 
questioned, only its amount. Lacking suitable options, individuals can normalise and 
acquiesce to it. Yet while debt is largely a product of power, questions of justice, fairness and 
well-being have to be raised and considered, otherwise there is little basis for criticising it 
(Sayer 2016). 
The study departs from neoclassical economics that treats a loan as simply a transfer of 
spending power from a saver to a borrower, and banks as mere intermediaries in the process. 
Keen (2011a) argues that banks do not need deposits in order to lend, because by issuing a 
loan they can endogenously create new spending power (i.e. new deposits) without reducing 
savers’ spending power. According to Post-Keynesian theory, ‘banks create money simply by 
an accounting operation: a loan is extended to a borrower creates both debt and spending 
power “out of nothing”’ (Keen 2011a: 155). Banking practices are also constituted by moral 
norms; for instance, individuals are morally obliged to pay their debts (Hudson 2015). 
Banks are an essential component of modern capitalism, in that they create and control 
token money, which is intrinsically worthless and is used as a means of final settlement of 
transactions (Graziani 1989). They possess monopoly-like power to generate and honour 
promises to pay that facilitate market transactions (Pettifor 2017). Extending credit to firms 
and households can create productive capacity for the economy, which can later be used to 
service the debt (Keen 2011b). But, as Minsky (1978) explains, banks are also responsible for 
causing excessive debt growth, asset speculation and financial instability. 
Bateman (2010) observes that international financial institutions and donor organisations 
promoted the liberalisation of finance as one of the effective ways to combat poverty and to 
stimulate entrepreneurial activity, following the model of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
In the early stages of private banking in transition economies, money came to domestic banks 
and microfinance institutions through investment by foreign banks and international financial 
institutions, rather than household savings (Ruziev and Dow 2013). Development agencies 
often stipulate social missions, such as poverty reduction and rural development, as their 
lending criteria, and expect a return on equity (Bateman 2010). 
The liberalisation and de-regulation of the banking sector in post-Soviet countries in the 
1990s aimed to increase competition and choice in the market, in the hope of injecting much 
needed foreign-backed investment in fledgling economies after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Ruziev and Dow 2013; Lane 2001). The number of retail banks, microfinance 
institutions and pawnshops increased in Russia and Central Asia. They provided loans not 
only to business and middle class groups, but also to more risky and vulnerable working class 
and poor people (Guseva 2005; Ruziev and Midmore 2014). 
In the 1990s and 2000s, US and other Western financial institutions invested into 
Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s banking and non-banking sectors to fund a rapid expansion 
of credit, largely concentrated in petty retail trading, real estate and consumption. 
Kazakhstan’s banks actively borrowed from abroad through syndicated loans, securitisation 
and issuance of bonded debt. By 2007, Kazakhstani banks amassed external debt of USD 46 
billion, or 44% of GDP (International Monetary Fund 2010). In the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s 
banking sector was the second fastest-growing sector in the economy after the oil industry 
(Asian Development Bank Institute 2014). Before the 2007-08 global crisis, the banking 
sector consisted of privately owned financial institutions (Orazalin 2019). The crisis caused 
the bankruptcy of three major commercial banks. The government responded by injecting 
funds into troubled banks, and re-financing loans to stabilise the sector. Currently the sector 
has a mix of domestic, privately owned, state-owned banks and foreign-owned banks. 
During 2002–2007, Kyrgyzstan’s banking sector also expanded strongly, with average 
annual asset growth of 22% and loan growth of 57%, or 40% in real terms (Asian 
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Development Bank 2011). The total banking assets increased from 7.9 billion soms in 2002 
to 178 billion soms in 2015 (National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 2016). Global and 
regional financiers benefitted from lax regulation on interest rates and debt collection, 
enabling them to achieve high returns on equity. In Kyrgyzstan the average interest rate on 
microfinance loans was about 34% in 2014 (National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 2014). In 
2014 there were 24 commercial banks, of which two were controlled by the state, and the rest 
were either private domestic or foreign banks (International Finance Corporation 2016). 
Sixteen commercial banks had foreign share capital, of these ten had foreign shareholdings of 
more than 50%. 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section will examine how theoretical ideas 
on the moral economy, money creation and rent-seeking can offer critical insights on 
financial relations. In section two, I will briefly describe the research design and methods. 
The third section will explore the findings, analysing social relations and moral justifications 
involved in banking and non-banking sectors. The fourth section will offer a critical 
discussion on debt. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the study’s key findings and ideas, 
and will suggest how the article has contributed to the literature on the moral economy and 
post-Soviet studies. 
 
Ideas on morality, money and unearned income 
 
The moral economy 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, debt and credit have emerged as important issues. 
Many studies have critically examined various aspects of the financial sector, including the 
negative effects of lending on household indebtedness and social inequalities (Montgomerie 
2009; Bateman 2010), the disciplinary power of finance in shaping borrowers’ neoliberal 
subjectivities (Erturk et al. 2007), the illicit role of major banks in siphoning off capital from 
the global South (Moore 2012; Cooley and Heathershaw 2017), and the significance of 
finance in creating rentier-style capitalism (Hudson 2014; Standing 2016). 
The Foucauldian literature around the disciplinary power of finance examines how 
governmental technologies and procedures have organised and regulated ‘proper’ economies 
for a well-functioning international financial system (Vestergaard 2004; 2009). The IMF and 
the World Bank have developed a comprehensive system of standards and codes of good 
practices to ensure that capital has spatial freedom. Market order and freedoms do not evolve 
naturally or spontaneously, but require disciplinary power to normalise judgements and 
human conduct through mechanisms of surveillance and punishment. Vestergaard (2004: 
818) argues, ‘The efforts to “strengthen the international financial system” constitute a 
panopticism at the level of the world economy.’ 
The moral economy literature goes beyond questions of how economies are socially 
constructed by market discourses and power. It does not merely describe and explain 
economies as sets of social relations and practices, but evaluate them on moral and ethical 
grounds. It brings together positive and normative modes of inquiry to produce thick ethical 
descriptions (Sayer 2007). Normative reasoning cannot be divorced from explanatory 
accounts of the world. 
There are three ways in which economic institutions and processes are partly constituted by, 
and are in tension with, moral concerns, norms, beliefs and justifications. First, economic 
relations and roles have a constitutive moral dimension, in that people have ideas on what are 
their rights and responsibilities, what constitutes reasonable or unreasonable behaviour, how 
roles should be performed, and what appropriate conditions and circumstances are supposed 
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to exist (Sayer 2007). Once basic economic institutions and relationships have become 
established, normative questions are forgotten as practices become normalised and accepted 
(Sayer 2016). Their continued existence scarcely requires public moral deliberations or 
justifications, having become de-politicised and naturalised and treated as ‘facts of life’. 
Established economic arrangements are viewed as how things are and what people deserve, 
as in the ‘belief in a just world’. 
Property rights are important in shaping and naturalising moral economies. For instance, 
Marcuse (1996: 136) observes that in the Soviet Union ‘that part of the bundle of rights that 
is the right to dispose at a profit, or the right to speculate, did not exist in Soviet law.’ Rent, 
interest and speculative gains were ‘non-labour’ income, and were condemned and not 
permitted. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, constitutions and legislations provided the 
protection of private property and its disposition by its owners free of state control. The re-
bundling of rights to allow property owners to dispose of their assets without state restrictions 
was explained and justified by international financial institutions as how ‘free markets’ work. 
Nevertheless, in times of crises and discontent people’s faith in established institutions and 
norms can break, and find visible expressions through protests and counterpublics. During 
such crises powerful groups are involved in a continuous effort to secure the necessary 
acceptance for dominant institutions, and to create a perception of legitimacy (Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012). They provide reasons to adhere to established practices, to ensure unequal 
social relationships are described in legitimising ways, to fend off questions of validity of 
economic institutions, and to de-legitimise opposition and alternatives to the economic order. 
Their rationales primarily serve as rationalisations of their position and power (Fairclough 
and Fairclough 2012). 
Second, economic relations are contingently affected by people having some understanding 
of others’ situation, a degree of propriety, and some awareness of what kind of relations and 
things are conducive to well-being (Sayer 2007). For instance, Rudnyckyj and Osella (2017) 
argue that novel forms of consumption, production, finance and philanthropy in the global 
South are being elicited and reproduced through religious discourses that reconfigure such 
actions as an ethical duty. In Muslim-majority countries, halal-certified goods, Islamic 
banking and sadaqa (voluntary charity) are seen as an inward cultivation of godly devotion, 
and an outward expression of piety. In her study on Islamic businesses in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, Botoeva (2018) describes how pious entrepreneurs are switching from 
conventional to Shariah-compliant modes of operation. 
Moral emotions, virtues and qualities, however partial or imperfect, are the pre-conditions 
of economic practices. Though social inequalities and economic pressures can affect people’s 
fellow-feelings, moral sentiments and judgements of others’ motives and actions (Smith 
1976). For instance, powerful actors can come to view disadvantaged and poor groups as 
undeserving of sympathy and assistance, because the latter lack skills, knowledge and 
resources to warrant social recognition and respect. Competitive markets can accentuate 
traders’ self-interest as well as their sensitivity to customers’ wants and desires. 
People become habituated to care about some things of value (e.g. kinship, career and 
religion), and not for others (Sayer 2011). But these values and concerns can be re-assessed 
in situations of economic and social crisis (Archer 2000). Established economic practices can 
be re-evaluated and re-politicised in light of changing values. Though people can also be 
unwilling or unable to challenge the economic orthodoxy, because of vested interests, petty 
selfishness, resignation, lack of alternatives, myopia, forgetfulness, apathy and the sheer 
messiness of everyday life. For instance, pious Muslims may desire Shariah-compliant 
finance, but find it too difficult to arrange. 
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Third, evaluating moral consequences is as important as understanding moral justifications 
and influences on economic practices (Sayer 2007). While economic relations and practices 
can be shaped by meanings and motivations, they have innumerable unintended 
consequences. These consequences are likely to affect people’s well-being, and can be 
categorised as positive, negative or perverse. Outcomes are open to ethical evaluations and 
regulation, because of their ethical implications. For example, environmental activists 
demand strict controls on industries to limit their carbon emissions in order to save the planet. 
People’s relation to the world is one of concern. They continually have to monitor and 
evaluate how the things they care about are faring, and what to do next (Sayer 2011). But 
their ability to evaluate economic practices can be limited by economic pressure to survive in 
a competitive environment. Short-term financial concerns can be prioritised over long-term 
social ones. While intended and unintended consequences are vital in evaluating and 
justifying economic institutions, people can also appeal to other criteria, such as need, desert, 
justice and the environment. 
 
Production of money and unearned income 
Heterodox economists (such as Keen 2011b; Hudson 2014; Pettifor 2017) criticise 
neoclassical macroeconomics for failing to incorporate banks and money into economic 
analysis and modelling. They reject claims that money is neutral, banks are mere 
intermediaries between savers and borrowers, and bank lending is controlled by a reserve 
requirement set by central banks. Instead they maintain that the banking sector endogenously 
creates money and credit, and thereby affect investment, economic growth and financial 
instability (Minsky 1978). 
Banks occupy a unique position in a monetary economy, because they create and control 
money (Graziani 1989). Money is a bank’s promise to its customers based on trust, rather 
than backed by anything physical. A monetary payment is a transfer of that promise from one 
customer to another (Keen 2015). Although neoclassical economists assume that an 
economic transaction is a bilateral exchange between a buyer and a seller, in reality all 
transactions are triangular involving at least a payer, a payee and a bank. 
Keen (2011b) and Pettifor (2017) debunk a popular myth that money is credited through a 
money multiplier. According to this view, the government creates ‘fiat’ money by printing 
notes and coins, and then gives them to individuals. They then deposit the money into their 
bank accounts. Banks keep a fraction of the deposit as reserves determined by the central 
bank, and lend excess reserves to borrowers. The borrowers in turn deposit the loaned money 
into their banks, creating new reserves and loans and further deposits. The process stops 
when the excess reserves fall to zero. This model assumes banks need excess reserves before 
they can lend out. 
Contrary to the money multiplier model, where base money is created before credit money, 
Moore (1984: 9) cites Holmes (1969: 73) to argue that ‘[i]n the real world banks extend 
credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later.’ The direction of 
causality is precisely the opposite that is held by the neoclassical view. Keen (2011b) 
explains that in extending new loans, banks simultaneously create new deposits. If this 
generates a need for new reserves, then banks can turn to the central bank as a lender of last 
resort to supply them. Otherwise banks are forced to recall loans, resulting in a credit crunch 
(Keen 2011b). 
Pettifor (2014) criticises the assumptions of mainstream monetary economics that money 
exists as a consequence of economic activity, and that lending equals savings. Instead, 
deposits and savings are a consequence of the creation of credit money. Applications for 
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loans result in the creation of deposits, and this stimulates investment, economic activity, 
employment and income. According to Schumpeter (1934), banks can create new purchasing 
power (credit money) ‘out of nothing’ to finance entrepreneurial investment without 
transferring funds from savers to borrowers. Lending is determined by the risk of default and 
whether borrowers have sufficient collateral, rather than restricted to existing savings. 
Pettifor (2014) notes that the effects of limiting lending to existing savings would be to raise 
interest rates, and to contract economic activity. 
Banks can create credit money through a deceptively simple double-entry bookkeeping 
system (Keen 2009)2. Banks occupy a powerful position in a monetary economy, not merely 
because they can create money, but can charge for it – i.e. interest (Sayer 2015; Hudson 
2014). In doing so, they can ‘get something for nothing’. Pettifor (2017) observes that banks 
can create money by entering numbers into a computer, and can obtain a promise to repay at 
a certain interest rate. Money and interest are both social constructs, based primarily and 
ultimately on trust and power (Pettifor 2017). 
Classical political economy makes an important distinction between earned and unearned 
income (Tawney 1921; Hobson 1937). Earned income is what waged and salaried employees 
and self-employed people get for contributing to the provision of goods and services that 
others use (Sayer 2016). Unearned income is not conditional on contributing to the 
production of new goods and services, but is extracted on the basis of unequal ownership and 
control of scarce assets, including land and money. Banks can receive unearned income by 
virtue of property rights that legally entitle them to create and control money, which others 
lack but need and want. Banks’ costs of production of new credit money are negligible, and 
so the principal and interest are unearned income. This is a significant moral aspect of money 
creation in the modern economy. 
As Sayer (2016) observes, mere ownership of assets produces nothing, but can be used to 
extract rent from others. Just as landowners can charge rent on land on the basis of 
monopoly-like power, Pettifor (2017) argues that interest is rent on money that allows banks 
to make vast capital gains by siphoning rent (interest) from debt. In strengthening the power 
and property rights of the asset-rich (or the rentier class), neoliberalism has promoted 
unearned income and rent extraction (Hudson 2015). Unearned income is a deadweight cost 
on the economy, reducing social welfare and productive capacity. 
Clearly it is interest not credit that is the economic and moral problem. Credit oils the 
wheels of production and commerce. It covers temporary gaps between organisations’ 
expenditure and revenues, funds public and private large-scale, long-term investments, and 
brings forward people’s consumption and purchases (Sayer 2015). Moreover credit money 
can be good in situations where social actors would otherwise be dependent on savings and 
reserves. Access to credit also undermines the monopoly of lenders of existing money. But 
the benefits of credit are diminished by interest charges, which add to deadweight costs. 
Private commercial banks have quasi-monopoly power to create interest-bearing credit 
money that allow owners and shareholders to obtain unearned income. 
In addition to property rights, banking relations and practices are partly constituted by 
myths, norms, sentiments, discourses, justifications and rationalisations that over time 
normalise and de-politicise banks’ unequal power, unearned income and damaging effects. 
 
2 McLeay et al. (2014) argue that in practice commercial banks face limits on how much they can lend. Lending 
is constrained because individual banks have to lend profitably in a competitive market, and have to take steps 
to mitigate the risks associated with making additional loans. Furthermore central bank use a range of regulatory 
measures, including requirements for banks’ capital and liquidity positions, and short-term interest rates on 
central bank reserves, to ensure that banks do not take excessive risks when making new loans that could 
threaten the stability of the financial system. 
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For instance, financiers and neoclassical economists often reproduce the myth of lending 
savings to justify and legitimise banks’ unearned income (Keen 2011b; Pettifor 2017). In 
doing so, interest can be rationalised as just income for savers’ abstinence, and as ‘deserving’ 
income for banks’ financial and administrative costs (Sayer 2015). 
Hudson (2015) observes that paying one’s debts is portrayed a moral and legal right that 
locks borrowers into financial servitude to banks. Borrowers are expected to have a personal 
ethic of responsibility, and to honour their promise to banks to pay their debts despite 
experiencing personal hardship. Graeber (2011) argues that paying one’s debts has come to 
seem the very definition of morality. Banks call on borrowers to be morally responsible, 
using shame, guilt and honour to deter default. In contrast, ‘irresponsible’ debtors are seen to 
lack moral discipline and integrity. Popular morality blames them for going into debt, 
depicting them as being immoderate and greedy, while banks avoid moral criticisms of 
‘irresponsible’ lending and debt peonage (Hudson 2015; 2018). 
As Sayer (2016) notes, the neoliberal discourse frames market relations as formally equal 
and voluntary, and economic actors as free choosers. The discourse focuses on individual 
liberty and choice, and reduces economic relations to transactions between free-standing 
individuals pursuing their self-interest. Troubled borrowers are characterised as poor 
decision-makers (Erturk et al. 2007). They are abstracted from their social positions, in which 
they often act under duress facing weak options. The discourse serves to abstract borrowers 
from their unequal social relationship, and to justify exploitative practices in terms of 
individual rights and responsibilities. 
 
Research design and method 
The study used purposive sampling to recruit participants (Bryman 2012). The authors and 
several research assistants sent emails and rang banks and microfinance companies 
requesting their participation in the study. Then requests were made to international financial 
institutions, state officials and trade associations. Most of the participants were recruited in 
this way. The study then used snowball sampling to recruit the remaining participants. 
The study was based on semi-structured interviews the authors conducted in Almaty, Astana 
and Bishkek. The sample consisted of 28 participants, of which twelve were banks, one 
microcredit company, nine international financial institutions, four government ministries and 
agencies, and two trade associations. The sample size reflected the methodological aim to 
gather rich and detailed qualitative data through in-depth interviews (Smith and Elger 2014). 
At the start of the interviews, the participants consented to be recorded, and were assured that 
the data would be anonymised and stored in password-protected files. The interviewees were 
assured of confidentiality, and their names have been pseudonymised. 
Many interviews were conducted in Russian and some in English, and each interview lasted 
on average 45 minutes (ranging from 30 minutes to one and a half hours). The interview 
questions examined how the financial elites and state and non-state actors evaluated lending 
practices, what moral discourses and norms predominated their understandings, and what 
economic pressures shaped their judgements. The interviewees were encouraged to discuss 
what were the values, beliefs, norms and rights shaping the banking sector. 
They were digitally recorded, and then were transcribed and translated into English. The 
authors read the transcripts several times to understand what themes were emerging 
(Silverman 2011). While some initial codes were derived from the authors’ theoretical ideas 
on finance and morality, others emerged unexpectedly from the interview data. In this way, 
the authors avoided their preconceptions distorting their interpretation of the data (Fletcher 
2017). 
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The codes were changed, eliminated and supplemented as the data warranted until every 
piece of text was coded (Fletcher 2017). Some codes were re-coded into theoretical-informed 
categories that allowed for greater conceptual clarity. In total, there were 29 codes. NVivo 10 
computer software was used to help with coding the data (Bazeley and Jackson 2013). 
Several key codes, such as ‘justifications’, ‘modernity’, obligation to repay’, ‘social 
mission’ and ‘reciprocal norm’, were used to analyse how banks and other actors morally 
evaluated lending practices. The analysis revealed many similarities and some differences 
among the participants’ evaluations. Other codes, including ‘anti-bank protests’, ‘Islamic 
finance’3, ‘regulation’ and ‘economic problems’, were also developed, but they were not used 
for this article. At the end of the coding stage, the authors wrote extended notes on each code 
to develop their analytic thinking (Rapley 2011). 
The study’s overall research question was how did financiers, in particular banks, morally 
evaluate lending practices. There were also two sub-questions: i) what moral ideals, 
discourses, norms and rights were used to make such evaluations; and ii) how were economic 




Social mission and market ethics of lending 
Bateman (2010) argues that one of the abiding myths of micro-loans is that they fulfil the 
social mission of serving the poor. International agencies view micro-loans as a catalyst for a 
sustainable ‘bottom-up’ economic and social development. They channel credit to local 
banks and microfinance companies to disburse to poor and disadvantaged groups to establish 
and expand microenterprises and self-employment (e.g. cross-border shuttle trade), and to 
promote gender empowerment and community solidarity. In the study, several banks 
described how donors worked in partnership with them to support women microenterprises, 
poverty reduction and rural development. For instance, Tanya, a senior manager at a 
Kyrgyzstan’s bank, explained: 
We’ve a partnership with the Asian Development Bank, and it’s a programme for 
women entrepreneurs. . . . During our history we’ve had special programmes with the 
International Finance Corporation and have started to work with KIVA social lending 
platform. . . . Most of our social investors have special social targets. In our portfolio 
we’ve more than 46% women borrowers. It’s our social target. 
Tanya’s bank had received a significant amount of credit from international agencies to target 
specific vulnerable groups, in particular female entrepreneurs in rural areas. Special loan 
programmes shaped banks’ lending criteria to satisfy donors’ social mission and values. In 
the context of patriarchy in developing countries, providing opportunities for women to 
participate in the business sector is an important development goal for donors (Bateman 
2010). Micro-loans can improve women’s confidence and business acumen, thereby 
 
3 The code on Islamic finance was excluded for several reasons. During the fieldwork the authors found there 
were only two small banks that operated according to Islamic banking principles: Kyrgyzstan’s Eco Islamic 
Bank, and Kazakhstan’s Al Hilal Bank, which offered only corporate banking services. In the study none of the 
participants offered Sharia compliant retail products. Some participants were either very vague about the 
potential of Islamic banking to develop, or dismissed it. In 2014 Islamic finance accounted for only 2% of the 
total banking sector by assets in Kyrgyzstan, and there was no retail presence in Kazakhstan (International 
Finance Corporation 2016). More recent data suggests this remains largely unchanged. While some scholars 
(e.g. Hoggarth 2016) argue for the rise of Islamic finance in Central Asia, the authors found little evidence to 
suggest that commercial retail banks operated according to Islamic banking in the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
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empowering them in society. As agents of social change, banks and microfinance companies 
can develop an enterprise culture, and can tackle gender inequalities. 
But there is growing evidence of ‘mission drift’ in the micro-lending sector (Bateman 2010). 
Commercialisation veers organisations away from their original mission to reduce poverty 
towards strategies to maximise profit. In Kyrgyzstan, three major NGO microfinance 
agencies, Bai Tushum, Finca and Companion, became commercial private banks (Hasanova 
2018). They were lured by the potential to expand their loan portfolio beyond donor-
sponsored micro-loans, and to pursue more lucrative markets, such as consumer loans to the 
urban middle class. Some participants in the study explained the tensions between social and 
economic goals, as Tanya, whose bank used to be an NGO microfinance agency, observed: 
As we’re a commercial organisation, we should make a profit but . . . also we’ve 
social goals and we’ve special programmes with international organisations. . . . Of 
course, we’ve to be profitable. Of course, we should be profitable! 
Tanya’s organisation had moved away from being merely a vehicle for donors to achieve 
their social goals. As a commercial enterprise, it was imperative to make a profit. The social 
mission had become secondary to maximising profit. As Sayer (2007), notes, social and 
moral values can be compromised or overridden by economic pressures and interests. 
Hirschman (1982) argues that markets can be a benign force that tames wild passions, and 
liberates society from traditional bonds to achieve material improvements. But equally 
ascriptive relationships and customs can limit the beneficial effects of markets. Several 
interviewees described how banks and microfinance companies were trying to civilise and 
discipline borrowers by tackling cultural attitudes and practices. Jyldyz, a senior manager at 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), maintained that market virtues of prudence and 
punctuality were important for the financial sector, but also difficult to cultivate among the 
Kyrgyz population: 
We’ve developed a calendar for [borrowers] . . . this teaches them to consider many 
issues like seasonality of business, of harvest and expenses. Our main message is 
saving, say to the people that you should save. . . . You know, Kyrgyz people spend a 
lot of money on marriages, funerals and births because they’ re driven by 
traditions. . . . It’s a mindset, it’s a cultural thing we’re nomadic. . . . Historically we 
didn’t have clocks and we’re not strict on time and that’s why Kyrgyz people aren’t 
disciplined in repaying because it goes back to the roots plus cultural ceremonies. 
Jyldyz felt that banking operations were shackled by lack of clock time discipline and 
traditional obligations of lavish life-cycle ceremonies, resulting in many families struggling 
to save and repay loans. Jyldyz’s organisation ran educational and media campaigns, 
especially in rural areas, to warn people of the dangers of extravagant and carefree spending, 
and to promote virtues, such as prudence and punctuality. 
Most interviewees construed banks and microfinance companies as civilising and moralising 
agents. Lenders tried to educate and regulate borrowers to become industrious, honest and 
disciplined, and not to damage their trust- and credit-worthiness. In their research, Pelkmans 
and Umetbaeva (2018) also found that informal moneylenders saw themselves as pioneers on 
a civilising mission to tame chaotic spaces on the capitalist frontier. 
Booth (1994) explains that liberal markets can foster moral values, including formal 
equality, autonomy and freedom. Market actors are free from hierarchal and ascriptive 
relationships, and can formally access resources in pursuit of their projects. In our research, 
several banks favourably evaluated and compared the market mechanism of allocating credit 
to alternative arrangements, such as Islamic banking and rotating savings and credit 
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associations. Islamic values and finance were characterised as opposing women’s economic 
participation, freedom and equality. 
Our women don’t wear burkas. 55% of our employees are women, and 51% of our 
clients are women. They’re working or have a business. . . . Women in Kyrgyzstan 
are very independent, and traditional Islam is not practised here. 
Elnura, a bank director in Kyrgyzstan 
All banks operate on [market principles], and there’s only one bank that operates 
according to Islamic finance. . . . Islamic principles aren’t suitable for us. We don’t 
have such fanatical beliefs. We’ve to defend the values of our country and the market. 
Gulmira, a bank director in Kyrgyzstan 
For Elnura, the market system had expanded women’s freedoms and autonomy. Gulmira 
construed liberal markets as beneficial for society, and believed Islamic principles to be 
harmful. Most participants evaluated market-based lending to be fair, in that a vast majority 
of the population could access credit (see Pettifor 2017). Islamic banking had limited 
presence in Central Asia, and was seen to diminish women’s economic autonomy (cp. 
Hoggarth 2016; Botoeva 2018). Rotating savings and credit associations in Central Asia were 
exclusive organisations, because members were selected on the basis of high income and 
social status (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). 
But markets can equally undermine moral values essential for their success (Hirschman 
1982). The pursuit of profit can foster a culture of dishonesty and corruption (Wiegratz 
2016). Bateman (2010: 55) observes that competitive commercial pressures can force 
moneylenders to ‘pressure and hoodwink their clients in order to obtain new business’, 
calling this ‘a very serious case of “mission drift”’. Several interviewees framed incidents of 
negligence, dishonesty or fraud as aberrations committed by a few poorly educated or greedy 
individuals, rather than as widespread and routine phenomena. It was an article of faith that 
markets had largely civilising and beneficial effects on people and society. 
In one complex case of malfeasance, several employees at a Kyrgyzstan’s bank branch were 
accused of unlawful financial dealings. They had authorised loans to sub-prime borrowers, 
whose applications should have been denied because they had bad credit records. 
Recognising the damage of its reputation and business, the bank tried to blame a junior 
employee for the fraud, and to dismiss the incident as an anomaly, as Asel, one of the bank 
directors, claimed: 
There was a case of fraud with one of our employees. . .  But the borrowers must also 
accept responsibility because they signed contracts knowing that the employee’s 
scheme was fraudulent. . . . The incident of fraud was uncommon. . . . The bank has 
made concessions to the borrowers, and their loans have been prolonged for 6-8 
months and the interest rates have been reduced from 32% to 18%. 
In explaining the fraud, Asel pointed to an individual employee’s wrongdoing, and criticised 
the borrowers’ moral character. Asel’s narrative preserved her belief in the efficacy and 
efficiency of the market, and justified the revised loan repayments. Wiegratz (2016) argues 
that business leaders are likely to construe fraud as greed, individual freedom and self-
interest gone too far, rather than as systemic and pervasive in a neoliberalising society. Erturk 
et al. (2007) observe that financial problems are usually attributed to market actors’ lack of 





Cultural norms and liberal discourses of lending 
Ho (2012) argues that the culture and morality of the financial sector can be complicit with, 
not antithetical to, mainstream cultural assumptions and norms. Financial understandings of 
morality can connect with larger cultural narratives of economy and society. Several 
participants emphasised that moneylending reflected a general norm and acceptance of 
commodity exchanges to make a profit. Alima, a senior manager at a Kazakhstan’s bank, 
countered accusations that banks overcharged for loans by noting that they also had to attract 
funds: 
Banks have not only to give credits, but also get deposits. The difference between 
credit and deposit interest rates is the bank’s income. Banks also have additional 
costs. This is fair. 
Alima observed that banks’ income was the difference between attracting and lending money. 
It reflected a wider economic culture of trading and marking-up products to cover costs plus 
more to make a profit. Tanya compared lending with other forms of buying and selling, such 
as livestock trade: 
One person buys a cow and then sells it. Then another person re-sells it. Re-selling is 
very common in our economy, it’s our mentality of buying and selling, and re-selling. 
Moneylending and cattle trading were both examples of a generalised form of commodity 
exchange. Moneylending was construed as normal, natural and mundane, and as 
indistinguishable from other forms of buying and selling. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 
property rights were re-bundled to permit the right to dispose at a profit (Marcuse 1996). This 
legalised and justified speculation and non-labour income (rent, interest and capital gains). 
Commodity exchanges and the associated transfers of property rights and money have been 
widely accepted and practised (Authors). 
Ferguson (2009) observes that international financial institutions have implemented 
economic and legal reforms to ensure that ‘markets’, defined narrowly in terms of routinised 
buying and selling under competitive conditions, have become an established economic 
institution. Sayer (2016) argues that while powerful actors may ensure that their economic 
activities are described in legitimising ways, it is the established order of things that is the 
major factor in their acceptance. As Bourdieu (2000) notes, submission is less a product of 
conscious consent or force of ideas than a tacit and practical belief that becomes self-evident 
and common sense in the context of bodily habituation and lack of alternatives. 
Although moneylending can be complicit with neoliberal cultural norms of making money 
(Wiegratz 2016), it is qualitatively distinct from most forms of economic activity. Lenders’ 
income is extractive, meaning that they are dependent on borrowers to produce goods and 
services, and to generate a surplus, which is partly siphoned off through interest. In the 
research, several banks described how their income was derived from others’ enterprise and 
labour. 
Entrepreneurs make a profit, and we take a small part of their profit. If an 
entrepreneur makes five tenges [national currency] on a notebook, and we took five 
tenges, it makes no sense for him to take out a loan. But profits of our clients are quite 
high, their profits are more than our interest rate. 
Dina, a bank director in Kazakhstan 
It’s clients’ problem to find markets [for their products]. For them, to find a market is 
the most important thing. . . . If they get a loan, they feed us. . . . I tell them ‘Thanks 
to you, we exist!’ Honestly how much profit we have is only thanks to our clients. 
Medina, a bank director in Kyrgyzstan 
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Dina and Medina explained how banks extracted income produced by entrepreneurs and 
traders, while contributing nothing or very little to the production and distribution of goods 
and services. It is by virtue of property rights that legally entitle banks and microfinance 
companies to create and control money, which borrowers lack but need and want, that they 
can charge rent on money – i.e. interest (Sayer 2015). Their income is based on power, rather 
than on deliberations on what might be morally justified, ‘deserving’ or ‘earned’. In contrast, 
self-employed people and employees directly or indirectly contribute to the provision of 
goods and services that others use, and can be said to ‘earn’ their income. 
The discourse of consumer choice and individual autonomy is central to liberal celebrations 
of ‘the market’. Markets allow people to exercise judgement and decision without being 
gullible or deferential to authority (O’Neill 1998). Drawing on the discourse, several 
participants argued that borrowers had to take responsibility for their choices. 
It’s a choice. Nobody forces a person to take a loan. A borrower himself agrees with 
all conditions. So it’s absolutely unfair to blame somebody else because he agreed 
with all conditions. 
Alima 
In emphasising borrowers’ freedom and consent, Alima rejected accusations that loan 
contracts were unfair. The liberal discourse defends the market as a sphere of voluntary 
uncoerced contracts between free, equal and autonomous agents (O’Neill 1998). Moreover, 
in the transition from the Soviet command economy to a market economy, liberals celebrated 
‘the market’ for shifting decision-making powers from central planning authorities to 
individual market actors. Paternalism and elitism are rejected in favour of market choice and 
autonomy that allow individuals to shape their own lives (O’Neill 1998). 
In the abstract, markets can operate according to liberal principles of equality and freedom, 
but in concrete situations contracting parties are likely to be unequal in power, resulting in 
exploitation and injustice (O’Neill 1998). Some interviewees explained that high interest 
rates and strict enforcement reflected banks’ power over borrowers in Central Asia. Nurlan, a 
senior manager of a regional development bank, observed that Kyrgyzstan’s borrowers had 
no choice but to accept market rates: 
It’s good for banks and bad for people. Banks earn the money people are losing. 
People don’t have a choice, and practically all the banks are charging the same high 
interest rate. People don’t have a choice, they go to microcredit and are charged 60% 
or maybe 90%. It’s terrible. It’s a robbery. 
Nurlan maintained that banks had market power to control interest rates, and they received 
considerable income by siphoning interest from debt. The banks’ ownership and control of 
money allows them to take advantage of borrowers’ dependence, and to extract unearned 
income (Sayer 2015). Unable to be autonomous individuals or free choosers, borrowers are 
likely to act under duress within the unequal and dependent relationship with banks. 
 
Sanctity and myths of lending 
Graeber (2011) argues that the modern understanding on the morality of debt involves 
accepting one’s responsibilities, fulfilling one’s obligations to others, and paying one’s debt. 
Immorality consists of shirking one’s responsibilities, reneging on a promise, and refusing to 
pay a debt. Many participants believed that borrowers had to honour their contractual 
promise, and threatened legal action against those who failed to do. 
The government will never forgive loans. It’s people’s obligation [to pay back], it’s 
their responsibility. They can take the loan, but they’ve to be responsible. 
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Jyldyz 
If [borrowers] delay re-payments or don’t make payments, we’ll take them to the 
court. We’ll make sure that they will pay their debts. 
Asel 
Jyldyz and Asel believed that borrowers had a personal ethic of responsibility. Paying one’s 
debt was construed as moral behaviour (Graeber 2011). When borrowers reneged on their 
promise, the courts adjudicated against them, forcing them to comply. In cases of contract 
violation, Central Asian judges tend to uphold powerful owners’ property rights against 
disadvantaged groups’ needs and well-being (Author). The rule of law and the security of 
private property are used to promote the sanctity of contracts and debt claims (Hudson 2017). 
But the morality of paying debts is not necessarily justice, if powerful creditors become 
enriched at the expense of impoverishing debtors, who have to cut back on necessities, 
migrate or possibly revolt (Hudson 2017). Rather than construing debt repayments as a moral 
imperative (i.e. the sanctity of debt claims and the obligation to repay), the overall 
consequences can be morally evaluated (Sayer 2015). Several interviewees recognised the 
negative effects of repayments on people’s well-being. For instance, Maxim, a director of an 
association of microfinance companies in Kyrgyzstan, observed: 
The [borrowers] are very disciplined to pay back the loans because they’ve a 
particular mentality and tradition, but at the cost sacrificing their food security, 
education and health. . . .  [P]eople are making their repayments on time but are 
cutting back on essential goods. This obviously causes them immense misery. 
Maxim explained how borrowers felt obligated to honour their promises under a threat of 
legal action. As a consequence of reducing household expenditure to repay loans, people’s 
well-being was damaged. Graeber (2011) maintains that accepting one’s responsibilities and 
fulfilling one’s obligations can result in harm and suffering for much of the population. 
Moreover, as repayments come from those who have less money to those who have more 
money than they need, social inequalities can be exacerbated. Interest rate is a regressive, 
unjust and hidden form of redistribution of income (Tawney 1921; Sayer 2015; Hudson 2015; 
Kennedy 1995; Bateman 2010). 
In addition, high interest rates can deter productive investment, and can have deflationary 
effects on the economy (Hudson 2014). To achieve sustained economic growth, businesses 
and households require credit to cover temporary gaps between outgoings and revenues to 
prevent disruptions to the circuits of production and exchange (Sayer 2015). While credit is 
useful for the economy, interest is damaging. In the study, many banks explained that high 
costs of borrowing discouraged productive capital investment. 
Some of our customers wanted to build brick-making factories and processing plants 
for agricultural products, but the returns were over a long term and we’ve very high 
interest rates, so we weren’t interested. 
Medina 
Medina understood that it was unprofitable for businesses to borrow at high interest for long-
term productive investments. Hudson (2014) explains that interest can cause debt deflation, 
as loan repayments reduce aggregate demand and productive capacity in the economy. The 
higher the interest rate the lower the beneficial consequences for the population. 
A popular myth articulated by banks and neoclassical economists is that a loan is a transfer 
of money from a saver to a borrower, and that banks are intermediaries in the process (Keen 
2011a; Pettifor 2017). This justifies interest as a reward for savers’ abstinence, and as 
revenue to cover banks’ operating costs (Sayer 2015). Several banks in the research described 
how savers’ deposits became loans. 
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Grandmothers and retired people entrust us with their money. . . . They come here 
with their good money, worked all their life, and want a worthy pension. . . . If [a 
borrower] doesn’t pay off the loan, we can sell the collateral and refund the money to 
the grandmother. . . . . We must meet our obligations to the grandmother. 
Medina 
Medina characterised banks as brokers between savers and borrowers. They also had a moral 
obligation to return money with interest to savers, who were viewed as vulnerable and needy 
individuals. This representation of savers as a ‘deserving’ group helped to rationalise and de-
politicise high interest rates and intimidating debt recovery tactics. 
In reality, development agencies (e.g. the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development and the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund) as well as foreign banks have 
invested significant capital in the financial sector in the region (Charman 2007). For instance, 
Jyldyz explained that IFC had provided direct financing to major banks in Kyrgyzstan: 
We’ve been investing in commercial banks and microfinance organisations. Half of 
our investment has gone to the financial sector. Among our clients are KICB and 
Demir bank. . . . We’ve also invested in Bai Tushum, Finca and Companion. 
IFC provided both capital and technical support to establish and develop the financial sector. 
It is a misconception that commercial banks wait for ordinary savers’ deposits to come in to 
lend out. They can attract funds (often denominated in US dollars) from institutional and 
foreign investors. They can also create money by electronically typing money into borrowers’ 
accounts, thereby generating both liabilities and assets in equal amount (Keen 2011b). Banks 
are only limited by the viability of applicants’ business plan in creating money. 
Banks and microfinance companies can use popular myths to deflect criticisms of their 
practices. They evade critical scrutiny of how money is obtained and created, how it is 
‘invested’ in the economy, and how they are ‘rewarded’ for controlling it (Hudson 2015; 
Pettifor 2017; Bateman 2010; Sayer 2015). The myths can rationalise and conceal the power 
and domination creditors have over money, the economy and the population. 
 
Critical discussion on debt 
In the study the interviewees articulated moral discourses, norms and myths to counter 
accusations of usurious and predatory lending4. But critically, the moral construals and myths 
de-politicised and normalised the unequal relationship between lenders and borrowers. The 
participants tended to offer accounts of credit that disregarded power and class by abstracting 
market actors from their social context, and assigning them individual rights and obligations. 
The nature of debt belied the neoliberal rhetoric of consumer choice, market freedom and 
enterprise culture. 
Debt is a social relationship that involves economic dependency and power (Sayer 2016). 
Borrowers lack and need money, which lenders have ownership and control of. Some 
interviewees recognised that lenders took advantage of borrowers’ dependence to impose 
onerous contracts. Debtors had little choice but to accept exorbitant charges and to 
collateralise assets. They also bore much of the risks. Repayments were fixed irrespective of 
a change in personal or economic circumstances, and creditors threatened to seize and 
dispose of collateral in cases of default. 
Lenders’ income is unearned, meaning that they can siphon interest from debt without 
contributing to wealth creation (Tawney 1921; Sayer 2015). Their mere ownership of money 
 
4 Predatory lending refers to unethical lending practices that are unfair, deceptive and fraudulent. It can also 
involve aggressive marketing tactics. 
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produces nothing, but the power and sanctity of property rights and debt claims allow them to 
extract income (Hudson 2017). Several interviewees described how creditors profited from 
debtors’ labour, enterprise and austerity. The debt relationship became regularised, 
normalised and accepted in the context of inadequate options, establishing itself as part of the 
order of things without much ethical scrutiny (Bourdieu 2000). 
Interest is a net flow of income from debtors to creditors, from the relatively poor to the 
relatively rich (Kennedy 1995). Although donor-sponsored micro-loans sought to address 
social goals, debt involved a transfer of income from the weak to the strong. Some 
participants in the study explained how poor families experienced social misery, because 
household expenditure was reduced to make repayments. As a hidden redistributive 
mechanism, interest was responsible for exacerbating social inequalities and suffering. 
Hobson (1937) and Tawney (1921) make an important moral economic distinction between 
property, which is actively used by owners to provide goods or services that would not 
otherwise exist, and ‘improperty’, which is used by owners not as means of production or 
‘means of work but as an instrument for the acquisition of gain’ (Tawney 1921: 65-66). The 
study showed how money had become improperty, in that banks created and used credit 
money to extract income. Lenders were dependent on debtors to produce goods and services, 
and to generate a surplus, which was partly siphoned off through interest. In so doing, banks 
acquired unearned income. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the study was to examine how banks and microfinance companies morally 
construed and evaluated lending practices. It particularly wanted to investigate what moral 
ideals, discourses, norms, rights and myths shaped their understanding of the relationship 
between lenders and borrowers. The study sought to reveal how moral justifications and 
rationalisations were integral to unequal social and economic relationships between people. 
The study found that the participants often understood and evaluated the lender-borrower 
relationship using abstract liberal market principles and ethics in three ways. First, many 
participants construed themselves as civilising and moral agents, who fostered liberal values 
of equality, autonomy and freedom (Hirschman 1982; Booth 1994; Pelkmans and Umetbaeva 
2018). The market mechanism was favourably compared and evaluated to alternative 
arrangements of allocating credit. The market allowed people to formally access credit in 
pursuit of their projects. In contrast, rotating savings and credit associations involved 
hierarchal and ascriptive relationships that excluded marginalised and poor groups, and 
Islamic banking was seen to diminish women’s economic autonomy. 
Second, most interviewees celebrated the credit market as an arena of consumer choice and 
freedom (O’Neill 1998). Middle class groups tended to perceive the post-Soviet transition to 
a market economy as a shift of decision-making powers from central authorities to individual 
actors (Authors). People were free from paternalistic state planning controls. Borrowers were 
characterised as free choosers, who exercised personal liberty and responsibility in taking out 
a loan. Their contractual relationship with lenders was voluntary and consensual. Market 
loans allowed borrowers to shape their own lives. 
The participants in the study were very privileged middle class actors, and bank clients were 
also likely to be middle class individuals. A significant share of the total bank loan portfolio 
consisted of dollar-denominated mortgages, which were issued to borrowers to purchase 
apartments (Ruziev and Majidov 2013). During the 2001-07 housing bubble in Kazakhstan, 
the middle class dream of homeownership enabled banks to extract rent through mortgage 
rates. But re-payments became unmanageable for many borrowers, because of inflated 
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property prices and the depreciation of the national currency against the dollar, especially 
after the 2007-08 global financial crisis. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, rising debt and 
repossessions sparked waves of protests against banks and governments (Authors). 
In contrast, rural households usually borrowed small amounts (less than $1,000) from 
microfinance institutions, which charged higher interest rates than commercial banks 
(Angioloni et al. 2018). During the first decade of the 2000s, microfinance was the main 
source of credit for rural borrowers, especially in Kyrgyzstan. Many of them were issued 
loans to start a business venture, enticed by the hope of becoming successful entrepreneurs. 
But high interest rates and low-entry barriers meant that most of them struggled to survive 
and make a profit (Bateman 2010). 
Third, most participants in the study rejected the idea of debt forgiveness, and promoted the 
sanctity of contracts and debt claims (Hudson 2017). Despite the negative consequences on 
their families’ well-being, borrowers were expected to fulfil their obligations and pay their 
debts (Graeber 2011). When borrowers had reneged on their promise to repay, the use of 
intimidating and threatening debt recovery tactics was rationalised to defend the rule of law. 
The courts were duty-bound to protect creditors’ property rights over money, and to correct 
contractual violations (Weinrib 2002). 
This article has contributed to the moral economy scholarship. It provided a critical and 
qualitative research on how banks and microfinance institutions actually understood morality, 
and how they morally construed and legitimised their activities (Ho 2012; Pelkmans and 
Umetbaeva 2018). Their moral evaluations justified and normalised exorbitant interest rates 
and unearned income, and de-politicised social inequalities and suffering (Hudson 2017; 
Sayer 2015). 
The study also examined how property rights and power were vital. The post-Soviet legal 
system re-bundled property rights to permit speculation, non-labour or unearned income and 
improperty (Marcuse 1996; Author). The judiciary authorised and protected creditors’ right 
to siphon interest from mere ownership of money. In situations of default, the courts 
construed borrowers as wrongdoers and lenders as sufferers, and in so doing corrected the 
‘injustice’ inflicted by the former on the latter (Weinrib 2002). Frederic Bastiat (1996: 130) 
describes how wealth extraction involves legal and moral resources, ‘When plunder has 
become a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves 
in the course of time a legal system that authorises it and a moral code that glorifies it.’ 
In addition, the article contributed to post-socialist studies. It critically examined the role of 
financial institutions in creating post-Soviet economies where economic rent has become a 
significant form of obtaining income, alongside earning income through production and 
wealth creation (Mihalyi and Szelenyi 2017; Author). Neoliberalism did not merely support 
privatisation and marketisation in post-Soviet economies, but re-bundled property rights, 
created unequal ownership and control of scarce assets, and expanded the role of rent. 
The neoliberal transition to a market economy produced unearned income based on 
improperty, as banks disbursed loans on the basis of exchange-value rather than use-value, 
and used token money purely to extract wealth, rather than to create it. Classical political 
economy makes vital distinctions between earned and unearned income, and between 
property and improperty (Hobson 1937; Tawney 1921). But neoclassical economics elides 
such distinctions in abstracting market relations from the political economic context (Hudson 
2014; Sayer 2015). 
One policy implication arising from the article is to tackle unearned income and its negative 
social and economic effects. In the absence of strong moral economic principles against 
interest, private commercial banks have to be made publicly accountable (Sayer 2015). This 
can occur through either the nationalisation of private banks, or controlling their powers 
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through democratically determined legislation. In this way, the creation of credit money and 
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